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Summary 
This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity 
conservation and their impact of regulatory choices.   We surveyed the literature in the 
field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient 
biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) 
individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four 
types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored.  We 
discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental 
fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown 
dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.  
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1. Introduction   
 
The single greatest threat to biodiversity in the U.S. and around the globe is the loss of 
natural habitat to development and agriculture. Changing patterns of land use have 
reduced the carrying capacity of the environment in terms of the numbers of species 
that it can sustain.  As Oldfield (1984, 1991) puts it, “Developments are proposed, 
the development alternatives are evaluated, the social costs of habitat losses or 
extinction are ignored or casually considered, and the decision to develop is given the 
go-ahead, actually on the basis of incomplete economic information. It is by this 
gradual process of land conversion that entire ecosystems and wildlife species have 
disappeared.” Agriculture is following a trend in that more productive systems tend to 
have fewer species (Pimm and Gittleman, 1992). Both agriculture practice and urban 
sprawl are converting species’ natural habitats with an alarming speed - for example a 
net loss of approximate 65 million hectares of forests is estimated in developing 
countries between 1990 and 1995, representing 3.7% of the total remaining forests in 
these countries (UNEP, 2000, p. 38). 
  
Current economic systems have often led to over-exploitation of biological resources 
for reasons common to other public goods’ over-exploitation: weak ownership, 
missing markets, severe free ridings and large externalities etc (see Clark, 1973a; 
Dasgupta, 1982; Fisher, 1981b; Norgaard, 1984; Pearce, 1976; and Randall, 1979 for 
more detailed discussions). Frequently, externalities exist in cases where it is not 
possible to identify the particular individuals who are negatively affected by the 
actions of others but where public goods which accrue to society at large are affected. 
This holds particularly in the case of biodiversity. If a given ecosystem disappears, the 
negative impact on each individual might be too small to warrant individual action, 
but nevertheless the total impact, due to the large number of individuals affected, 
might be considerable and require policy intervention. Governments therefore are 
called upon to implement incentive measures to achieve a sustainable use of land in 
those cases in which private utility-maximization causes imperfect outcomes, as 
individuals do not take into account the impacts of their activities on the well-being of 
other individuals or the public at large.   
 
Most instruments developed by environmental economists and regulators to correct 
for externality problems have been studied in the context of environmental pollution.  
Examples include the imposition of artificial shadow prices in the form of 
environmental taxes or charges which reflect the damage to public goods, the better 
definition of property rights with the enabling markets, and the payment for / 
subsidization of behaviors more sympathetic to public interests etc.     
 
The situation concerning the conservation or the sustainable use of biodiversity is 
comparable but not identical. This is mainly due to greater information insufficiencies 
that prevent the regulatory measures being effective for biodiversity conservation.    4
Compared to other environmental degradation, biodiversity losses is more difficult to 
measure in extent and value - oftentimes the value of biodiversity resides in its pure 
existence, or possibly in its – as yet still unknown – future uses. The presumption for 
effective government invention in correcting/internalizing externalities relies in that 
government has superior information and vastly reduced transaction costs in ensuring 
that public health and amenity considerations are adequately reflected in the actions of 
individual producers. This is oftentimes not true in case of biodiversity conservation. 
Individual landowners oftentimes either have better information on the species 
habituated in their lands (and the costs associated to preserve them) or are in a better 
position to discover this information because of legal boundaries that prevent 
government investigation of the lands.   
 
This paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation 
and their impact of regulatory choices. The structure of the paper is the following: In 
the next section, we shortly review various types of information insufficiencies in 
biodiversity conservation efforts. In section 3, we examine major regulatory tools for 
biodiversity and their bearings on information constraints. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Information Insufficiencies in Biodiversity Conservation     
 
Information insufficiency presents one of the greatest challenges to biodiversity 
conservation (OECD, 1999).    Information insufficiency arises from many aspects for 
the regulator to take effective conservation measures. The efficiency of many 
regulatory tools (e.g. standards and limits, charges and taxes, contracts etc.) that are 
used to internalize the environmental externalities critically depends on the amount of 
information regulator has on the marginal benefits and costs of abatement / 
conservation.  Besides serving as a prerequisite for effective regulation, information 
per se can well be a goal of regulation in dynamic settings.    In this section we review 
various informational constraints faced by regulators and identify four types of 
information failures in making conservation decisions: biological uncertainty, natural 
variability, hidden individual information, and monitoring problem
1. All these four 
types of informational failures result in insufficient information on the marginal 
benefit and cost curves of conservation that are essential for regulatory tools to 
effectively internalize the externalities.   
 
First type of information insufficiency comes from biological uncertainty.  Even 
though recent years ecological research has greatly furthered our knowledge of the 
complex aspects of biodiversity, such as ecosystem changes, habitat patchiness, and 
the role of natural and human-induced disturbances on biota (e.g. Reid and Miller, 
1989), we still only have very limited knowledge for biology process (e.g. threshold 
                                                        
1  We refer to Dosi, C and M. Moretto’s work on non-point source pollution in defining various information 
insufficiencies.    5
values), which results in the uncertain forms of relationships in the system.  Many 
fundamental questions about several aspects regarding the specific levels and their 
linkage at which biodiversity may be considered remain unanswered. We do not know, 
for example, how many species the world holds, even to an order of magnitude, much 
less the range and habitat each species inhabits.  The impacts of habitat loss / 
fragmentation on genetic diversity and how biodiversity influences the ability of 
ecosystems to withstand stress are poorly known; so are the impacts of landscape 
fragmentation on the functioning of ecosystems, population viability and the functions 
and activities of many individual species (Myers, 1995; Ehrlich and Daily, 1993; 
Myers and Simon, 1993; Perrings et al, 1992; Solbrig, 1991). The impact of changing 
pattern of land use upon biodiversity is highly complicated and research has just 
begun.    We poorly understand in quantity, if not in quality, how the encroachment of 
agricultural production system (especially in an uncoordinated manner) cause habitat 
loss and fragmentation, how air and /or water pollution, excessive sedimentation of 
water course and excessive hunting and logging lead to species loss even when 
natural habitat remain intact; how adoption of new farming practices contributes to 
decline of biodiversity of crop species on farm; and certain agrochemicals leads to 
decline in biodiversity within species (Srivastava, et. al. 1996)   
 
Biological uncertainty inherent probably is the greatest obstacle for proper evaluation 
of biodiversity enhancing activities, but there are possibilities for improving 
information over time.    Learning aspect of this process provides interesting research 
prospects. According to Tomas et. al., learning may be passive or active.  Passive 
learning has not been addressed in any substantive fashion in the biodiversity 
literature, although there exist more general economics analyses upon which such 
analyses could be based.  For example, the exact locations of the thresholds are 
unknown until the biodiversity loss process passes the threshold, and information 
jumps.  Some work on dynamic resource problems with uncertain technology might 
offer some insights to this problem (e.g. Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1981), but little 
research has been conducted in the biodiversity context.  Active learning refers to 
“social experiments” whose main purpose is to generate information.  These would 
involve deliberately manipulating the system in what may appear to be a sub-optimal 
way in order to improve our understanding of the relevant relationships.    While such 
experiments may be politically unpopular, they might improve efficiency in the long 
run.    
 
Second type of information insufficiency is natural variability. Natural variability in 
biodiversity conservation context is associated mainly with stochastic shocks from 
uncontrollable factors such as climate change and invasion of some alien species to 
local ecosystem.  The distinction between natural variability and biological 
uncertainty arises from the ability to learn over time regarding the latter, while natural 
variability is mainly uncontrollable and stochastic. Unlike crop markets, there are not 
even partial risk and insurance markets to hedge/control the randomness in 
environmental effect.  Therefore any state-contingency must be built into the   6
conservation policies under consideration. This physical uncertainty feature implies 
that there will be a range of possible biodiversity outcomes observed by regulator 
with any conservation effort.  The disappearance of certain birds in one area for 
example might well be a result of weather change rather than the actual logging 
activities taken in that area.  Researchers are increasingly aware of the stochastic 
influence resulted from physical uncertainty (e.g. Segerson, 1988).  In the model 
Segerson presented in 1988 in the context of non-point source pollution, for example, 
the ambient level is represented by a probability function that is conditional on the 
abatement practice.    This type of models also corresponds to the situation where the 
environmental impact is deterministic, but the regulator can only observe the impact 
level imprecisely and inaccurately with a probability distribution.     
 
Third type of information insufficiency, hidden individual information, stems from 
asymmetric information between the regulator and landowners. Landowners to be 
regulated are diverse and heterogenetic in land development potentials, production 
technology, conservation awareness, habitat and specie situation, conservation skills, 
and attitude toward risks(Smith 1995, Smith and Tomasi 1995, Horowitz and Hueth 
1995, Wu and Babcock 1995), for which oftentimes landowners either have better 
information or are in a better position to collect the information (Goeschl and Lin, 
2003).  When serious information asymmetry exists between a regulator and 
landowners, the design of efficient environmental policy is hampered.   
 
There are two types of information asymmetries studied by literature, one related to 
information stock (status information asymmetry) and the other related to information 
flow (ability information asymmetry) (Goeschl and Lin, 2003).  Status information 
asymmetry comes from landowner’s superior information about her own (e.g. 
production technology) and the land (e.g. habitat and specie situation), while ability 
information asymmetry states the ability differences between the regulator and 
landowners in collecting these information.  Conventional arguments for status 
information asymmetry root in specialization but recent literatures emphasize the role 
of self-conscious investment in information discovery (Cremer et. al. 1998a, 1998b).  
It is the ability asymmetry that gives rise to these investment decisions in collecting 
information. There are many plausible reasons that both types of information 
asymmetries (status and ability) exist, with legal barrier being an important one in 
biodiversity conservation context.  In United States of America, for example, 
according to Natural Heritage Data Center Network’s estimate, 70% of species listed 
under the Endangered Species Act depend on nonfederal land for the majority of their 
habitat (Polasky and Doremus 1998).  Without land owners’ consent, legal barriers 
exist for the regulator to enter the private land and collect biodiversity-related 
information on these lands, which implies the cost / ability asymmetry in collecting 
information between the regulator and the landowners. 
 
Status information asymmetry, and the efficiency loss associated with it, is well 
studied in economics literature built on the seminal work on mechanism design theory   7
under asymmetric information by Hurwicz (1972), Groves (1973), Mirrlees (1971), 
Baron and Myerson (1982) and others.  Not until recent years did economists start 
studying ability information asymmetry (Cremer et. al. 1992, 1998, 1998a, Sobel 
1993, Lewis and Sappington 1997).  These studies, all starting with the assumption 
that there is only information acquisition cost (ability) difference between the 
regulator and agent, try to endogenize the information structure and evaluate the 
regulated agent’s incentives to acquire information.    Goeschl and Lin (2003) studied 
dual information asymmetry situation where both types of asymmetry exist in the 
context of biodiversity conservation. There are also some literatures on the incentives 
of agents to acquire information about the value of an object before participating the 
auction (Lee, 1982; Matthews, 1984; Milgrom, 1981; etc.)   
 
Last type of information insufficiency arises with monitoring problems closely 
associated with regulator’s inability to observe directly individual’s conservation 
efforts and impact on the biodiversity or to infer them from observable inputs (i.e. 
land development) or the total biodiversity loss.       
 
There are a number of contributing factors to regulator’s inability to monitor input 
(effort level) and output (impact) of conservation measures, as Xeppapadeas observed 
in the context of pollution, “such as equipment and personnel limitations, or inability 
to enter the polluter’s premises.  On the other hand, while it is relatively easy to 
determine whether the polluter has installed adequate equipment for pollution 
abatement, it is difficult to make sure that this equipment is being operated at the 
desired level.      As a result, the development of efficient measurement methods could 
be very costly” (Xepapadeas, 1991). Therefore, the government faces a situation 
where it could be prohibitively costly to measure with sufficient precision the 
individual’s production of / contribution to conservation.  In environmental 
economics literature, this is addressed by standard moral hazard models in which 
conservation efforts are privately observable (see Laffont and Tirole 1993 among 
others). 
 
Monitoring problem sharpens when the number of landowners increases.  When 
there is only one landowner in a setting – either where one farm accommodates all the 
species under consideration, or where many landowners are sufficiently independent 
one another to allow them to be regulated individually – there is no question of 
“responsibility” for observed biodiversity loss (Dosi and Moretto, 1994, 1997).  
However, it is more likely that many landowners’ (diffuse) activities combine to 
determine a single measure of biodiversity loss at a given location.    This is similar to 
non-point source water pollution question in the literature and moral hazard models 
and adverse selection with multiple firms are discussed by, respectively, Segerson 
(1988) and Xepapadeas (1991, 1992) and Shortle and Dunn (1988).  The existence 
of multiple landowners raises a number of difficult regulatory issues, most of which 
relate to information and monitoring.  It is no longer possible to attribute the 
biodiversity loss to the activities of any one landowner since “damages” are not   8
separable across landowners.  Thus, it is necessary to infer each landowner’s 
potential contribution in case of violation.    The larger the number of landowners, the 
more difficult is the monitoring, and the more difficult is the information problem for 
both regulator (obtaining information about landowners) and the landowners 
themselves (obtaining information about each other).  The existence of more 
landowners implies a greater potential free-rider problem, if each landowner perceives 
its own damage to biodiversity to be small relative to the group, and decreases the 
likelihood of cooperation among landowners to reduce biodiversity loss.  Moreover, 
this observability problem is particularly severe in biodiversity conservation as many 
species (e.g. migrating birds and animals) roam across a vast territory.    The regulator 
in general is in a difficult position to detect biodiversity loss /specie endanger in a 
certain location, not to mention to attribute this loss to individual landowners.  
Researchers and regulators duly discuss in this context regulatory options like team 
reward/punishment (e.g. Groves, 1973) and random reward/punishment (e.g. 
Xepapadeas, 1991) which we will discuss later. 
 
Even though information is one of the greatest constraints in effective conservation 
regulation, the effort of collecting information is no less controversial.  Property 
owners and regulators have sharply divergent view of the desirability of increased 
information about species status and distribution.  In North America, for example, 
the Endangered Species Act has been the center of a fierce debate.  On one side, 
groups representing various economic interests have called for radical reform of the 
law in order to reduce economic impacts and to protect private property rights.  On 
the other side, environmental groups vehemently oppose any weakening of the current 
law, contending that it must be maintained or strengthen to ensure the long-term 
survival of endangered species. Conservation proponents favor greater efforts to 
collect information about the status of species, including location and health of 
population and habit (e.g. Wilson, 1992).  By contrast, property rights advocates 
vociferously attack any move to expand government information collection efforts, 
such as the short-lived National Biological Survey.     
 
 
3. Regulatory Instruments for Biodiversity under Information 
Constraints 
 
Environmental economist and regulators have been developing and practicing a wide 
array of regulatory tools to preserve the biodiversity around the world, each of which 
subjects to different information constraints.  We discuss in this section three major 
types of regulatory tools, namely land takings, environmental taxes, and contracts, 
and the informational constraints they face.  Summarized in Table 1, these three 
measures portrait a wide spectrum of regulatory choices, under which many other 
regulatory tools, land access restrictions for example, fall into.   In practice, a   9
combination of different regulatory measures oftentimes is a more desirable choice to 
tackle the pressures that lead to biodiversity loss (OECD, 1999; Smith, 1995). 
 
Table 1: Three Regulatory Choices for Biodiversity Conservation 




Taxes/ Changes and 
Removal of Adverse 
Incentives/Subsidies 
Contracts 
Producer of Public 
Goods 
Public Private Private 
Financial Costs to 
the Regulator 







Land Takings and Land Access Restrictions 
 
The traditional instruments of biodiversity conservation in Europe and North America 
have been the acquisition of land (takings) by the state with or without compensation 
and the imposition of restrictions on the use privilege of private property. Examples 
include establishment of national parks and reserve zones worldwide. The advantages 
of these approaches are that they are “conceptually easy to understand and that 
pre-formulated goals can be achieved with high probability, as long as adequate 
monitoring and enforcement can be assured.” (OECD, 1999)   
 
These approaches however have several problems and limitations besides imposing 
high financial costs to the regulator. The problems have been discussed widely in the 
literature and many have to do with insufficient information (see Shogren and 
Tschirhart 2001 for a review). As a consequence of insufficient information on land’s 
conservation values (because of any type of aforementioned informational failures), 
regulator’s land acquisition decisions are prone to efficiency losses.  Without 
sufficient conservation value information it is imaginably difficult for the regulator to 
make trade-offs among conservation projects given a limited governmental budget.  
When it comes to a specific land parcel, an acquisition decision has to be made upon 
the comparison between conservation value and market value, which is problematic 
without sufficient information on the former (Polasky and Doremus 1998).  In the 
case of acquisition, the government not only asserts ownership of the land, but usually 
also takes on a management role. Similar to other settings, generating a public good, 
in this case conservation, through public production is prone to suffer from efficiency 
losses implicit in public production such as lower productivity and excessive 
opportunity and management costs of the conservation activity (Innes 2001).  Apart 
from the problem of the government as an inefficient producer, compensation is 
fraught with various difficulties. If compensation is absent or too low, governments 
may be tempted to oversupply conservation. Also problematic incentives may be   10
created for landowners (such as ‘shoot, shovel, and shut up’, see Brown and Shogren 
1998), and little cooperation can be expected from landowners in prospecting for 
biodiversity (Polasky and Doremus 1998). If on the other hand a compensation 
scheme is implemented, basing compensation on opportunity costs (market value of 
the land mainly) may be problematic since it will encourage early development of 
land in order to raise the payment (Blume et al 1984). Basing compensation on 
benefits (paying for number of birds increased for example) on the other hand will be 
problematic since, with only a few exceptions that the results can be monitored 
through satellite (Pagiola et. al. 2003), it generally requires the cooperation of the 
landowner and cannot be relied on to produce a reliable result (Polasky and Doremus 
1998). Imposition of land use restrictions is less drastic than land takings, but to the 
extent that they are imposed, their impact is fundamentally identical to that of land 
takings in direction, if not in volume (Innes 2001).   
 
Both land takings and land use restrictions are quantity-base instruments. Compared 
to price-base instruments such as taxes discussed in the next section, quantity-base 
instruments were traditionally regarded less affected by environmental benefit 
(damage) uncertainties (due to aforementioned biological uncertainties and natural 
variability) (Weitzman 1974 and others). Environmental economists acknowledged 
that benefit uncertainty on its own has no effect on the identity of the optimal efficient 
control instrument, but that cost uncertainty can have significant effects, depending 
upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit damage and marginal cost functions.  
Adar and Griffin (1976, p180) stated ‘‘. . . the introduction of uncertainty in the 
damage function has nothing to say about the choice of policy instruments’’ and 
similar views were hold other environmental economists (Fishelson 1976; Baumol 
and Oates 1988). Starvins (1996) observed “in the real world, we rarely encounter 
situations in which there is exclusively either benefit uncertainty or cost uncertainty” 
and in the presence of simultaneous uncertainty in both marginal benefits and 
marginal costs and some statistical dependence between them, benefit uncertainty 
expressed through the covariance term can make a difference for identifying the 
efficient policy instrument. A positive correlation tends to favor the quantity 
instrument, and a negative correlation favors the price instrument.  Research along 
this direction however has been slighted since.   
 
Apart from the theoretical shortcomings of the traditional approach of providing 
conservation, over the last twenty years this model of biodiversity conservation has 
encountered several practical and political limitations. First, conservation 
opportunities on public land are naturally limited when significant amounts of target 
species exist on private land (see for example Innes, Polasky and Tschirhart 1998). At 
the same time, this model of conservation cannot reach forms of biodiversity, such as 
agro-biodiversity, where conservation is inherently tied up with continuing private 
production activities. In the managed landscapes of Europe that have been in 
productive agri- or silvicultural use for many centuries, a significant proportion of 
biodiversity falls into this category. The involvement of the landowner as the manager   11
of the essential production input land is critical in these circumstances. A second 
limitation has been the increasing political cost of limiting the property rights of 
landowners and practical experiences with the adverse conservation incentives 
contained in some of these measures. The third limitation has been the questioning of 
the logic of public production of public goods and a shift in economic policy in many 
European countries, leading to a retreat of the state from production activities. This 
had two effects: On the one hand, for new projects there has been an interest in 
alternatives to the conventional model, such as contracts, through which the private 
production of public goods would be carried out. On the other hand, for existing 
conservation projects the retreat of the state has created a necessity to develop 
alternative instruments as a result of management of significant land assets having 
been transferred to newly privatised entities. To manage these fundamentally new 
relationships between public bodies and private corporations, new instruments have to 
be developed.   
 
Environmental Taxes/Fees and Removal of Adverse Incentives 
 
One important change in biodiversity regulation over the past twenty years has been 
the move towards new instruments for the private production of public goods through 
price mechanisms – imposing environmental fees /taxes, removing adverse incentives 
/ subsidies, or both.  We include in environmental taxes the wide range of 
non-compliance fees, nature taxes, and conservation levies being applied around the 
world to discourage biodiversity damaging activities.  Removal of the adverse 
subsidies, which are usually the results of government support programmes to 
agriculture, is fundamentally equivalent to imposition of environmental taxes (See 
OECD 1999 for a review of countries’ practices).   
 
These price-based incentives measures which aim to internalize the externalities are 
easily understandable but only applicable in situations where impacts are easily 
measurable (e.g. hunting) and sources of impacts can be easily monitored.   
Informational insufficiencies can greater jeopardize the efficiency of these measures. 
For the discussion below, we focus on two types of these taxes – the Pigouvian type 
and the Ambient Tax type.  Most taxes we find in biodiversity conservation are 
Pigouvian type and ambient tax, originated in water and air pollution regulation, is 
often applied in biodiversity conservation projects where collective/team reward/ 
punishment is implemented. 
 
There are considerable amount of literature on how a system of Pigouvian taxes can 
generate efficient outcomes by internalizing the negative externalities and therefore 
inducing individual agents to produce the public goods (biodiversity) at the socially 
desirable levels (e.g. Baulmol and Oats, 1988).    However, this is critically dependent 
on the condition that marginal benefit and cost curves are observable with sufficient 
accuracy and at a sufficiently lost cost.  Weitzman (1974) and others show how 
uncertainties of marginal benefit and cost curves can result in inefficiency of such   12
taxes.   
 
However, when an individual’s damage to biodiversity cannot be observed with 
sufficient accuracy at a reasonable cost because of unknown biological process 
(biological uncertainty), stochastic influences (natural variability) and / or because of 
the inability to measure individual contribution to the environmental problem 
(monitoring problem), Pigouvian taxes will be not appropriate.   An ambient tax 
system has been proposed by some economists such as Segerson (1988) and 
Xepapadeas (1991, 1992) in context of environmental pollution.     
 
“[Ambient] taxes are essentially a charge per unit deviation between a desired and a 
measured ambient concentration level, and are imposed on every potential polluter 
once measured ambient pollutant levels exceed some desired cutoff level” 
(Xepapadeas, 1995a).   
 
The approach proposed by Segerson is composed of two parts.  The first is 
tax/subsidy payment that depends upon the extent to which the total ambient level 
(observable) exceed the cutoff level, the suspected polluter pays a tax proportional to 
the excess, while ambient levels below the cutoff result in a subsidy.  The second 
part is fixed penalty imposed whenever ambient levels exceed the cutoff.  This 
scheme is similar to on described by Holmstrom as a solution to free riding in the 
context of organizational structure.   By eliminating the need for firm level 
monitoring of emissions or abatement effort, the mechanism can lower a regulator’s 
administration costs.  In addition, Segerson’ approach solves free rider problem by 
imposing a penalty equivalent to the full marginal benefit of reduced ambient 
pollutant levels, rather than just paying a share of it, on each firm
2.  However, 
Sergeson’s “penalize all” mechanism does not have government’s budget balancing 
condition, which would require the regulator to dip further into a general revenues (in 
case of subsidies) than would the random penalty scheme proposed by Xepapadeas 
(1991).   
 
Xepapdeas (1991) advocates a combination of subsidies and random penalties when 
only aggregated ambient level can be observed.   This random penalty approach was 
much criticized because of its limits (Kritikos, 1993; Herriges et al, 1994).  First, 
contrary to the original claim in Xepapadeas, random penalties cannot be used to 
achieve compliance if firms are risk natural.  Budget balancing still requires that 
each firm pay, on average, only a fraction of the damages associated with pollution 
emissions.  Second, the random penalty mechanism may face problems in both 
political and legal arenas, due to the random assignment of the penalty in the event of 
shirking.    Firms that consistently comply with their assigned abatement objective can 
still be penalized.  Finally, the random penalty mechanism relies on the assumption 
                                                        
2  “For example, if marginal damages are valued at $100, the regulatory agency will collect $100 from each 
pollutant for the marginal unit of ambient pollution, for a total collection of $ (100n)” (Segerson, 1988).   
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that each firm treats the other firms as being in compliance otherwise multiple 
equilibria problem remains to be solved. 
 
Mix of Pigouvian tax and ambient tax is further proposed by Xepapadeas (1995b).  
The paper argues that severe monitoring problems make Pigouvian taxes preferable to 
ambient taxes as the latter does not require individual level of observibility.  
However, when the information insufficiencies increase along the dimension of 
natural variability or biological uncertainty, increase in observability of individual 
emissions through, for example, investment in pollution monitoring equipment might 
be desirable for both the regulator and the agents – given agents are risk averse.  
Increase in observability of individual emissions will lead to a reduction or even 
abolition of ambient taxes and increase of Pigouvian tax.  Therefore, Xepapadeas 
(1995b) shows that under uncertainty the efficient regulatory scheme is a mix of 
Pigouvian and ambient taxes.  The Pigouvian fees are imposed on emissions / 





Another important phenomenon of the move towards new instruments for the private 
production of public goods has been the rise of contracts between the relevant public 
entity (such as conservation agencies) and private landowners. Contract mechanisms 
are receiving increasing attention in recent years worldwide to encourage 
biodiversity-friendly agricultural practices. One example is the Regional Integrated 
Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project implemented by the World Bank in 
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua (Pagiola et al., 2003). Under these types of 
contracts, locals are paid to generate biodiversity conservation.   
 
A key concern for both researchers and policy makers in the development of such 
contracts has been to ensure that the conservation contracts are drawn up as efficiently 
as possible. Contract design is therefore a major consideration and has increasingly 
attracted the attention of environmental economists.   
 
Initially, the literature identified as the source of such efficiency losses the asymmetry 
of contract-relevant information (hidden information) between the conservation 
agency (the regulator) and the conservation provider (the landowner) with respect to 
the cost of conservation (Smith 1995, Smith and Tomasi 1995, Hueth 1995, Wu and 
Babcock 1995). This perspective leads to casting the problem in terms of a standard 
principal-agent problem with two types (typically low- and high-efficiency) or a 
continuum of types. (Hurwicz 1972, Groves 1973, Mirrlees 1971, Baron and Myerson 
1982 and others)   
 
It has been noted subsequently that one serious shortcoming in that literature is the 
underlying assumption that the costs and/or benefits of preservation are actually   14
known to the agent. This assumption has been attacked as unrealistic on a number of 
grounds: Often, there are no existing markets for the outputs of conservation activities, 
so both agent and principal will find it hard to assign a proper cost and/or benefit 
estimate to a particular conservation activity. Also, collecting information about the 
cost structure of complying with obligations regarding inputs and/or outputs is costly 
so that landowners will not enter negotiations fully informed about their own costs 
while the regulating agency cannot collect this information without considerable cost, 
consent, and often support of the landowner (Polasky and Doremus 1998). A second 
generation has therefore started to explore the issue of information collection in the 
context of biodiversity conservation in order to provide answers to situations where 
the both principal and agent are imperfectly informed, but differ in their ability to 
collect information either for technical (capital) or legal (property rights) reasons 
(Polasky 2001).   
 
Goeschl and Lin (2003) studies a mixture of asymmetries between the conservation 
agency and the contracting landowner, one relating to asymmetric status regarding 
information about the type of landowner (low- or high efficiency) involved in the 
contract and the other relating to asymmetric ability to collect contract-relevant 
information that is unknown to both parties at the outset of the contract negotiations. 
As a typical example, think of a conservation contract that requires the contracting 
farmer to provide adequate habitat for some species. Informational asymmetry will 
arise on the one hand because the farmer will have information about the opportunity 
cost of giving up agricultural land based on his intimate knowledge of his land assets. 
This information will not be available to the conservation agency. On the other hand, 
prior to a careful inspection under the consideration of habitat provision neither the 
agency nor the farmer will know whether additional resources will be required to 
provide adequate habitat on the land under consideration. Examples would be 
measures to ensure higher soil moisture or different cultivation patterns. On one farm, 
the land may be adequate as it is, on another, certain measures will be required to 
ensure adequacy. Since there will commonly not have been a need to collect this 
information at some previous point in time, both the farmer and the conservation 
agency will not know the additional cost to the farmer of providing adequate habitat. 
What makes this information deficiency relevant to consider in the contract, however, 
is that the farmer will have much greater scope to ascertain the adequacy of his land 
for the activities to be contracted over than the agency for both legal and technical 
reasons. In situations that involve such a combination of informational asymmetries 
between the conservation agency and the landowner, the agency needs to consider not 
only the static information asymmetry, but also the differential ability of the parties to 
become informed about contract-relevant parameters. If conservation agencies take 
these aspects into consideration, we show that we would expect to observe very 
different contract negotiation strategies than those optimal under either pure status or 
pure ability asymmetry.   
 
   15
4. Concluding Remarks   
 
Informational constraint represents one of greatest challenges to both environmental 
economists and policy makers in regulatory choices.    The nature, type, and extent of 
informational insufficiencies have profound impacts on regulatory measure choices, 
research of which is of both intellectual vitality and real-world relevance. This review 
suggests an integrated framework that explicitly consider efficiency trade-offs of 
different regulatory measures under various informational structures will be a key step 
in enhancing our understanding of this area further.   
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